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 Canada's Broken Dream - The Avro Arrow 
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Post Canada's Broken Dream - The Avro Arrow
While searching for a photo to post in the main thread I stumbled across one of my most favorite Canadian subjects.

ImageThe Canadian Built Avro ArrowImage



I am going to do a back ground story and then provide a bunch of related links.

I hope you enjoy this true story of how the Canadian Government sold a World Leading Canadian Company down the river :shakehead


Nov. 1, 1951 - Jan. 13, 1997

It's the closest thing Canadian industry has to a love story and a murder mystery. The Avro Arrow, a sleek white jet interceptor developed in Malton, Ontario in the 1950s, could have been many things. It might have become the fastest plane in the world, our best defence against Soviet bombers, the catalyst to propel Canada to the forefront of the aviation industry. Instead, it became a $400-million pile of scrap metal, and the stuff of legends.

The RCAF needs a new plane to catch Soviet bombers, the Royal Canadian Air Force puts out the call for a jet that will fly faster, higher and further than anything on the market.

The Story

At the end of the Second World War, Canada is one of the world's major industrial powers. The Royal Canadian Air Force is the third largest in the world, and aircraft manufacturer A.V. Roe Canada produced some of the best bombers of the war. In 1949 the company introduces the North America's commercial jet, the Avro Jetliner, but then the Korean War breaks out and all efforts turn towards producing jet warplanes.

Avro's latest success story is the CF-100 "Canuck," a long-range, all-weather jet designed to intercept nuclear-armed Soviet bombers crossing the Arctic Ocean. But there are fears of a "bomber gap," and the RCAF wants a plane that can fly higher and faster than anything currently available. Avro, under new president and general manager Crawford Gordon, has the answer.

Did You Know?

• The Royal Canadian Air Force wanted a plane that could defend the Canadian Arctic from new Soviet bombers. They studied all jets that were currently available, including the McDonnell F-101 Voodoo, but rejected them. In April 1953, the RCAF announced specification "Air-7-3," calling for a new supersonic twin-engine, two-seat interceptor. The plane was to have a range of 1100 kilometres and a top speed over Mach 1.5. A contract was awarded to Avro in December 1953.

• The Canadian government-owned Victory Aircraft company in Malton was bought by Britain's Hawker Siddeley, and renamed A.V. Roe Canada, which became Avro Canada Ltd.
• Crawford Gordon became president and general manager of A.V. Roe Canada in 1951, at age 37. He was a protégé of Liberal minister C.D. Howe, who was responsible for Canadian industrial production during the Second World War. Gordon immediately diversified the company, turning it into 39 separate companies, including Avro Canada and Orenda Engines.

• The Avro Jetliner was built for Trans Canada Airlines (which became Air Canada.) Only one Jetliner was ever built. It carried airmail from Toronto to New York in April 1950 and set numerous records before C.D. Howe ordered Avro to suspend production and focus on warplanes.
• The sole Jetliner was leased to American aircraft mogul Howard Hughes for six months, who used it as a personal toy. In February 1957 it was cut up for scrap.

• Avro began designing the CF-100 "Canuck" in 1946; the first one flew in January 1950. It is the only operational Canadian combat aircraft ever built. The plane was not ready for use in the Korean war, but 692 were built between 1950 and 1958. Belgium used 53 CF-100s.
• The Canuck took its name from the Curtis JN-4 Canuck trainer used in the First World War. Unofficially, pilots and crew members referred to it as the "Clunk."

• An "interceptor" is any fighter or missile designed to stop enemy aircraft or missiles.

Unveiling the Arrow


The first sleek white Avro Arrow is unveiled in front of a crowd of 12,000 at the Avro Plant in Malton. But the Russians unveil something of their own.

The Story

After four years of work by 14,000 people, the first Avro Arrow is wheeled out of a hangar in Malton, Ont. on Oct. 4, 1957. A huge crowd is on hand to marvel at the sleek white craft. But the Arrow's timing turns out to be disastrous: the Soviet Union launches the Sputnik 1 satellite the same day, diverting attention from the Arrow and prompting some Canadians to begin rethinking the country's approach to strategic defence.

Did You Know?

• Sputnik 1 was the world's first artificial satellite. It was the size of a basketball and weighed 83 kilograms. While it didn't really "do" anything other than beep, it caught the West off guard. Many feared the Soviets could use the same rocket technology to launch ballistic missiles carrying nuclear weapons from Europe to North America. Sputnik began the space race and led directly to the creation of the U.S. National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA).

• At the unveiling of the Arrow, Defence Minister George Pearkes said that although we are entering the missile age, the era of manned aircraft was not over. He said that aircraft and missiles complement each other, and aircraft have the advantage of introducing human judgement into battle. Unlike missiles, aircraft can turn back. Later, Pearkes was instrumental in the cancellation of the Arrow program.

The Arrow's maiden flight

Canada's first supersonic fighter plane makes its triumphant first flight.

The Story

At 9:52 a.m. on March 25, 1958, Arrow RL-201 roars into the skies above Malton for the Avro Arrow's first test flight. Three kilometres below, all non-essential Avro staff pour out of the plant to watch their plane circle overhead. Some 35 minutes later, the Arrow touches down and comes to a halt, braking parachutes trailing behind. Test pilot Janusz Zurakowski, who is given a hero's welcome, complains only that the cockpit has no clock.

Did You Know?

• Arrow RL-201 used just half of the runway before taking off at a steep 45 degree angle. It flew up to 3,350 metres high at speeds up to 250 knots – a small fraction of its capability. The only problem recorded was the failure of two tiny switches (out of 4,000) in the plane's nose gear bay.

• Two chase planes followed the Arrow's maiden flight. Jack Woodman flew a F-86 Sabre and Wladek "Spud" Potocki flew a CF-100 with a photographer aboard.
• Zurakowski and Potocki were both Polish pilots who flew for the Royal Air Force during the Second World War before moving to Canada. The only other pilots to fly the Arrow were Peter Cope and RCAF Lt. Jack Woodman.

• There were many Arrow tests on the ground before the maiden flight. During one taxi test ,all four tires on the main wheels exploded. The landing gear failed during two test flights, causing minor accidents.
• On subsequent test flights, the Arrow flew 15,240 metres high and reached speeds of Mach 1.98 (over 2,000 kilometres per hour, nearly twice the speed of sound.) In 1958 there were 57 Arrow test flights totalling 61 hours.

• All five of the first Arrows used Pratt & Whitney J75 engines. Orenda Engines, a division of Avro, began developing a much more powerful engine, the PS-13 Iroquois, in 1953. These engines would be installed in the "Arrow Mark 2," beginning with RL-206. These engines used expensive titanium to keep weight down. Avro expected the Arrow to break all world speed records once the Iroquois was installed.

Is the era of manned aircraft over?

The Bomarc missile casts a shadow over the Avro Arrow as Canada enters the missile age.

The Story

The Arrow is poised to become the fastest aircraft on the planet, but some critics are asking if it matters anymore. As the Soviets and Americans race into the age of missile defence, the U.S.-built Bomarc missile is now front and centre in North American defence strategy. The Arrow, built to chase bombers, may be on shaky ground.

Did You Know?

• In 1957 Prime Minister John Diefenbaker agreed to join the United States in an integrated North American Air Defence (NORAD) treaty. It was a controversial decision because he did not consult his cabinet first, and the decision raised questions about Canada's sovereignty. And it raised concerns about Canada's commitment to the Arrow.

• NORAD was focussed on implementing two new weapons systems, the Bomarc missile and the Semi-Automated Ground Environment (SAGE) surveillance and weapons control system. The Bomarc was a surface-to-air guided missile with a range of 640 kilometres. In September 1958, Diefenbaker announced that two squadrons of Bomarc-B anti-aircraft missiles would be stationed at North Bay, Ont. and La Macaza, Que.

• The Bomarc was an anti-aircraft weapon, as was the Arrow. It would not defend against nuclear Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles (ICBMs). The Americans were planning to use the Bomarc to destroy bombers that their manned interceptors missed. The Bomarc carried a nuclear warhead and would destroy an enemy plane by detonating a nuclear explosion nearby. Canada was under some pressure to build northern Bomarc stations to avoid these explosions happening over heavily populated Southern Canada.

Crawford Gordon reacts to blow to Arrow program

Prime Minister John Diefenbaker has some bad news for Avro, but Avro president Crawford Gordon puts on a brave face.

The Story

Less than a week after the Arrow's first flight, Conservative John Diefenbaker becomes prime minister in a landslide electoral victory, and inherits the Arrow program from Liberal Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent. Diefenbaker distrusts Avro executives and is gravely concerned about the spiralling costs of the Arrow program. In September 1958 he announces that the government will not complete the full run of Arrow production, but will only authorize completion of planes currently in production.

Diefenbaker then announces that the entire Arrow program will be reviewed in six months. Avro president Crawford Gordon goes on the defensive, taking to the airwaves to reassure the public – and Arrow workers – that this does not mean the Arrow program is cancelled.

Did You Know?

• Following Diefenbaker's announcement, Avro began a determined campaign to get the decision reversed, lobbying the public, the federal government, and even the United States Air Force to shore up support for the Arrow.
• Ontario's Crawford Gordon was a Liberal protégé and had a reputation for volatility. Many believe he shared a mutual animosity with Prime Minister Diefenbaker, a Saskatchewan lawyer who distrusted the Bay Street whiz-kid.

• The Arrow program was becoming increasingly expensive, and consumed a large portion of Canada's defence budget. Avro continually approached the government for more money; by 1958 the government estimated that it would cost over $1 billion to complete production of the Arrow. There were clearly doubts Canada could fund both the Arrow and the Bomarc missile at once.

Diefenbaker announces cancellation of the Arrow

Shocking Parliament and Avro employees, Diefenbaker announces the Arrow and Iroquois engine programs are cancelled immediately

The Story

It's a day that would soon become known as "Black Friday." At 11:00 a.m. on Feb. 20, 1959, Prime Minister Diefenbaker stands before the House of Commons and makes the unexpected announcement that the Arrow and Iroquois engine programs are terminated immediately. Members of Parliament greet the announcement with stunned silence. CBC Radio reporters Norman DePoe and Tom Earle are on hand to witness the announcement and get a first-hand explanation from Prime Minister Diefenbaker.

Did You Know?

• A key reason for cancelling the Arrow was the mounting cost of the program. Though the Arrow was an expensive plane, critics of the cancellation later argued that development could have been completed for the cost of the cancellation fees alone. The Arrow program was cheaper than purchasing the Bomarc, SAGE and replacement interceptors from the United States. It was cancelled a month before the end of the six month review period Diefenbaker gave the program.

• Canada still needed jet interceptors. Two years later the RCAF took possession of 66 used McDonnell F-101 Voodoo jet fighters from the United States, a plane they had rejected as inadequate before commissioning the Arrow. The planes were eventually given to Canada in exchange for Canadians staffing radar bases on the Arctic's Pinetree Line, the first of three Cold War lines of air defence that included the Distant Early Warning (DEW) Line and the Mid-Canada Line.

The Voodoos were eventually replaced by the MacDonnell-Douglas CF-18 Hornets used today. Between 1982 and 1988 the Canadian government purchased 138 Hornets from the United States at a cost of $5.2 billion.

• Defence Production Sharing was supposed to allow Canadian firms to compete on an equal footing with their American counterparts. But Canadian bids on defence contracts suffered from built-in delays and price penalties that usually favoured U.S. competitors.

• Other nations were also under the impression that manned fighters would become obsolete in the age of missiles. In April 1957, British minister of defence Duncan Sandys published a white paper arguing that all British fighter projects should be cancelled in favour of ground-launched missiles. The paper spelled the end of many British aircraft manufacturers. The United States Air Force cancelled similar interceptor plans.

• Canada and the United States were hotly debating deployment of atomic weapons in Canada. U.S. President John F. Kennedy demanded Canada accept the atomic warheads that the Bomarc was designed to carry. Diefenbaker said he was against it, which prompted the resignation of his Minister of National Defence Douglas Harkness. That forced a no-confidence vote in the House of Commons, leading to the collapse of Diefenbaker's minority government and the subsequent Liberal minority of Lester B. Pearson.

• The nuclear warheads were eventually delivered on Dec. 31, 1963 and remained in the Canadian armoury until 1969.

• The Bomarc and SAGE were ineffective systems, and were soon phased out in both Canada and the United States. Both of Canada's Bomarc squadrons formally disbanded on April 7, 1972, and the missiles were returned to the United States.

Political reaction to the Arrow's cancellation

Despite the huge impact the Avro Arrow's cancellation will have on Canadian industry and defence, opposition leaders won't criticize the decision.

The Story

The decision to cancel the Avro Arrow means $400 million wasted tax dollars, instant unemployment for thousands of workers, and a defence department turned upside down. Yet the leaders of the two main opposition parties do not oppose the decision. Liberal leader Lester B. Person and Hazen Argue of the Co-operative Commonwealth Federation (CCF) choose their words carefully.

Did You Know?

• Lester B. Pearson joined the government in 1928 in External Affairs, and was elected to the House of Commons in 1948. He was active in the United Nations and became president of the Seventh UN General Assembly. He was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize for his proposal to send a peacekeeping force to the Suez Canal area. He became leader of the federal Liberal party and was elected Prime Minister in 1963.

• Hazen Argue was elected to the CCF in 1945 at age 24 and became party leader in 1960. When the CCF became the New Democratic Party a year later, Argue ran for leader, losing to Tommy Douglas. Argue joined the Liberals and was eventually made a senator by Pearson. He became the first Canadian Senator to face criminal charges (misusing Senate funds) in 1989, but died before the case went to trial. He was Canada's longest serving parliamentarian.

• The cancellation of the Arrow was a tragedy for workers in the Toronto area, and local media criticized the decision. But outside Ontario, there was little reaction.

Avro workers react to massive layoffs


14,525 shocked Avro workers are terminated at once. As they leave, they express their anger to CBC reporters.

The Story

Shock. Disbelief. Anger. Despair. These are the reactions of the 14,525 Avro workers who found themselves unemployed en masse on Black Friday. CBC Radio's Bill Beatty is at the plant to witness "a funeral procession" of hundreds of cars, lined up bumper-to-bumper, carrying toolmakers, engineers and office workers from the plant for the last time. Many of them offer Beatty their parting shots.

Did You Know?

• Before noon on Feb. 20, 1959, the Department of Defence production told Avro executives that the Arrow and Iroquois programs were cancelled and that all work on the projects must cease that day. At 4:00 p.m. an announcement was made over the plant loudspeaker that all employees were laid off immediately. Later on, a small number of workers were called back to the plant to work on other projects, and a compensation package was offered.

• At the time of the cancellation of the Arrow, Avro was the third-largest corporation in Canada. The Arrow program employed more than 40,000 people at Avro and related suppliers. The Malton and Brampton suburbs of Toronto were hardest hit. About a quarter of Brampton's workers were employed at Avro.

• On Black Friday, chief engineer Robert Lindley asked Avro executives if he could fly the Iroquois-equipped RL-206 just one time, but his request was rejected.

• News of the cancellation came just two weeks before Arrow RL-206 was scheduled to fly with the new Iroquois engine. Avro engineers had expected that plane to smash the world speed record.

• The end of the Arrow and Iroquois meant the end of Avro Canada Ltd. Avro president Crawford Gordon and executive vice-president Fred Smye believed the message from the government was that the projects were cancelled and no more projects would be offered.

The Arrow is destroyed


In an astonishing act of devastation, all traces of the Avro Arrow are ordered destroyed.

The Story

To the horror of Avro employees, an order comes from the Ministry of Defence Production to erase all traces of the Avro Arrow. Complete planes and those in production are chopped into pieces, as are all models, tools and the entire production line. Blueprints, pictures and film are destroyed. The remains of the mighty plane are sold to a Hamilton scrap metal dealer and melted down to make pots and pans.

Did You Know?

• Exactly who ordered the destruction of the Arrow remains a mystery – nobody in the government or military admitted to giving the order. Avro's Fred Smye said he got the call from the Department of Defence Production, and issued the order to have the planes destroyed. He called it "the worst mistake I ever made in my life." Pierre Sevigny, associate deputy minister for Diefenbaker, believed a spiteful Crawford Gordon issued the order himself.

• Lax Brothers Salvage in Hamilton carried out the destruction and bought the scrap from the entire Arrow program for $300,000. The production line was cut up with acetylene torches, while the planes were chopped up with saws. Everything went to the smelter. Metal from the cut-up Arrows was sold for about 14 cents a kilogram - an entire 30,000 kilogram Avro Arrow went for a little over $4,000.

• Cameras were not allowed inside the Avro plant when the planes were destroyed, but the Montreal Standard's Weekend Magazine chartered a helicopter and had a photographer take pictures as the planes were dismantled.
• Test pilot Peter Cope compares the destruction of the Arrow to "a destalinization project." Mario Pesando, chief of project research at Avro, says it was "like the Romans at Carthage."

• Some pieces of the Arrow project survived the destruction and can be found in museums across Canada. Many small pieces were smuggled out by employees. In 1998, two Arrow Pratt & Whitney J-75 engines were found at Ottawa's National Research Council. The National Aviation Museum in Ottawa has the nose and cockpit and landing gear from RL-206, a pair of wings, and an Iroquois engine. Ironically, the museum also houses Canada's only remaining Bomarc missile.

Brain drain to the United States


In the months following Black Friday, Avro's team of world-class engineers find jobs south of the border.

The Story

Avro's greatest asset is the team of top-notch engineers it has assembled from across Canada and around the world. But since Black Friday it looks like Canada's aviation industry is on its last legs, and there is no longer a future for these bright minds in this country. Efforts are made to keep them together, but soon the exodus begins – particularly to an eager United States and its burgeoning space program.

Did You Know?

• Avro vice president of engineering Jim Floyd worked to install teams of Avro engineers in American companies like Lockheed and Boeing, hoping they could eventually return to Avro. But Avro never reopened, and Floyd himself returned to Britain to work on the Supersonic Transport studies that led to the Corcorde. Other Avro engineers found work at General Electric and Pratt & Whitney in the U.S.

• In the United States, the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA) had formed the Space Task Group to put astronauts in space. Thirty-three Avro engineers and scientists were recruited, and went on to help develop the Mercury, Gemini and Apollo programs.

• Avro chief of design Jim Chamberlain lead the Canadians at the Space Task Group and was a key designer of the Mercury capsule that put John Glenn into orbit on Feb. 20, 1962 – the third anniversary of Black Friday. Several ex-Avro employees went on to work at NASA's Mission Control.

• Avro president Crawford Gordon, who once drew a salary greater than that of the president of the United States, was fired after the cancellation. He worked in Montreal for a while, squandering a $3-million fortune, and died impoverished in New York City in January 1967. Friends say he drank himself to death.

Arrow mania

The Story

More than 30 years after the Arrow met its demise, "Arrow heads" across Canada are rebuilding the legend. Arrow books and movies are being written, replicas are being built, and parts of the plane are turning up after years of concealment. On CBC Radio's Morningside, Peter Gzowski finds out about the plane's popularity by talking to Arrow fans including journalist June Callwood, who believes that one Arrow may have escaped.

Did You Know?

• In 2002, volunteers at the Toronto Aerospace Museum were building a full-scale, all metal replica of the Avro Arrow. It won't fly, but it is designed to taxi along at six kilometres an hour.

• Another initiative, the "Arrow 2000 Project," hopes to build a flying 2/3-scale replica of the Avro Arrow.

• During the testing period of the Arrow's construction, nine 1/8-scale magnesium alloy models of the plane were launched from Nike missiles into the skies over Lake Ontario. In recent years, several groups have hunted for the models on the lake bottom, and at least two have been found.

• There are many legends of a lone Arrow escaping destruction. In addition to Callwood's speculation about an Iroquois-equipped arrow flying away at dawn, there are tales of an Arrow being spirited away on a covered flatbed truck. Some say that RL-202 cannot be seen in the aerial photos of the destruction, and may have been being fitted with missiles at a different location. None of these stories can be confirmed.

Debating the Arrow's legacy


The Story

In January 1997, CBC broadcasts a four-hour miniseries called The Arrow that generates powerful reactions from Canadians who love or hate the legendary plane. Calling in to CBC's Radio Noon, historian Michael Bliss calls the miniseries "an orgy of mythologizing," arguing that Avro was a disaster and the Arrow got what it deserved. Broadcaster Elwy Yost, who worked at Avro for six years, says that's the most stupid statement he's heard in 40 years.

Did You Know?

• The Arrow was a two-part series starring Dan Aykroyd as Crawford Gordon. It co-starred Sara Botsford, Michael Ironside, Michael Moriarity and Christopher Plummer. It was shot in Winnipeg, Man. and featured a scale replica of the Arrow built in Wetaskiwin, Alta. by sales estimator Allan Jackson. It was broadcast on Jan. 12 and 13, 1997. The movie's "docudrama" format was generally well received, but irritated some viewers who wanted greater historical accuracy.

• Michael Bliss is a University of Toronto history professor. He has published a dozen books and is noted for his studies of Canadian medical history.

• Bliss tells his history students that the last Avro Arrow did indeed escape, and is stored in a barn in Saskatchewan. "It is taken out and flown once a year. By Elvis."

• Film historian Elwy Yost hosted TVOntario's Saturday Night at the Movies from 1970 to 1999. News programs aside, it is Canada's longest running television series that is still on the air.

• Yost worked in the personnel department of Avro and was involved in laying off thousands of workers. The last pink slip he issued was to himself.

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Post Re: Canada's Broken Dream
Design and Development

Avro Canada was created in December 1945, when the British Avro acquired the National Steel Car factory that had been building its Lancaster bombers during WWII. After WWII, Avro Canada designed a number of aircraft. The CF-100 "Canuck" a transsonic straight-wing all-weather fighter was the most successful one and 692 were built, including 53 for Belgium, between 1950 and 1958. In 1954 Avro Canada came under governement control, with an aircraft division and an engine division. The latter would later become Orenda engines.
It was inevitable that Avro Canada would try to design a replacement for the CF-100. Initially, these designs resembled CF-100s with swept wings and supersonic performance. Later a number of designs with swept and delta wings were studied, but the effort began in earnest in April 1953, when the RCAF announced it requirement Air-7-3. It wanted a twin-engined, two-seat interceptor with a radius of action of at least 1000km, a ferry range of no less than 6000 nautical miles (11000km) and a maximal speed of more than Mach 1.5. It was to be equipped with a sophisticated fire control system, and to have an all-missile armament. A need for 600 such aircraft was initially envisaged. No such aircraft was available elsewhere, and the RCAF was unwilling to comprise by adopting a less than 100% satisfactory aircraft. So a new type would have to be designed. In the end, the RCAF would adopt one of the alternative designs it had studied, but rejected --- the McDonnell F-101 Voodoo.

It is interesting to note that when the USAF formulated its requirement for a modern interceptor, it did choose a single-engined, single-seat fighter. This reflected the confidence of the USAF in automatized systems, as had already been used by the F-86D, for the all-weather interception mission. The RCAF may have felt, probably wisely, that the workload for a single pilot in bad weather or at night was too high. The preference for twin-engined aircraft may have been based on the assumption that these are safer for long patrol flights over the vast unpopulated regions of Canada. The requirements of the USAF were also less demanding in other important aspects: Radius of action was required to be only 600km, and the bomb bay of the F-102 and F-106 was tailored for only four Falcon missiles. All this resulted in a smaller aircraft. The USAF adopted a two-stage development program, in which the F-106 was to be preceded by an interim model, the F-102. In this way the USAF limited the risks of the development process.

The armament of the new fighter was to be all-missile, and the missiles were to be stored in an internal missile bay. This protected them for the elements and reduced drag, but in combination with the range requirement it called for a large and roomy fuselage. To make access for maintenance easier, and to reduce structural problems with the wing spars and the missile bay, a shoulder wing configuration was adopted. The chosen wing was a large, very thin delta wing with marked anhedral. When this design was submitted to the RCAF in 1953, it was immediately accepted. Wind tunnel tests, as well as tests with rocket-powered scale models, produced favourable results.

However, the choice of the engines was to be a problem. Originally, the Rolls Royce RB106 engine was chosen, but it was soon recognized that this would not be available. Then the Wright J67 was chosen, but this engine was cancelled in 1955. Finally, it was decided to use an indigenous engine, the Orenda PS-13 Iroquois. Because this engine would not be available for the first prototypes, it was decided to use the Pratt & Whitney J75 to power the Mark 1 prototypes and pre-series aircraft. The thrust of the J75-P-3 with full afterburner was 8390kg, equivalent to the maximal dry thrust of the Iroquois. The Arrow Mk.2 would have the Orenda engines. The Mk.2A would have more fuel and redesigned jet intakes and nozzles. The final Mk.3 version, with uprated engines, would be able to fly at Mach 2.5.


he delta wing was thin and had considerable anhedral. In plan view, the leading edge was swept at 60 degrees and straight, apart from a dogtooth at half-span. Internally, the spars of the outboard wing panel were swept at almost the same angle as the leading edge, while those of the inboard panels had much less sweep. This was reflected by the leading edges of the big control surfaces. The Arrow had separate elevators and ailerons on its delta wing. The leading edges were drooped, more strongly on the outboard wing sections. The wing contained six integral fuel tanks: in the inboard wing panel behind the landing gear compartiment, in the wing roots, and a small tank in the part of the wing on top of the fuselage, inboard of the landing gear compartiment.
The fuselage was large and box-like, preceding that of the MiG-25 and F-15. A compartiment in the nose was designed for the Astra radar and fire control system, that in the end never was installed. The CF-105 would probably have been able to be fitted with a larger radar antenna, and the nosecone tapered sharply. The engines intakes were rectangular, with large splitter plates to divert the boundary layer. They were far forward of the wing leading edge and the engines, so that considerable volume was occupied by the intake ducting. Two fuel tanks were installed in the fuselage, between the engine intakes. The armament bay, which was larger than that of a Lancaster or B-29, was installed below the intake ducts. It was 16ft 1in long, 9ft 6in wide, and 3ft high. The projected armament consisted of a version of the AIM-7 Sparrow, known as Sparrow II, and the Hughes Falcon. The doors of the missile bay could be opened in 0.3 seconds. Launch tests were performed at speeds up to Mach 1.5.

The engines were installed at the extremeties of the aft fuselage, with the engine nozzles projecting well beyond the wing trailing edge and the tail. The engines could be changed in 30 minutes, by extracting them backwards.


The Arrow Mk.2 was to be powered by two Orenda PS-13 Iroquois engines. Development of the PS-13 began in 1953. It was a twin-spool engine, designed to deliver 8720kg dry trust and 11800kg with afterburner. The high-pressure spool had two compression and two turbine stages; the low- pressure spool had three compression stages and a single turbine stage. The then still very scarce and expensive titanium was used for a number of parts, to keep the weight down. Of a total weight of about 2000kg, 30% was accounted for by titanium parts.
The PS-13 was run at full dry power during ground tests in 1955. In 1957, the RCAF received a B-47E Stratojet on loan from the USA to test the Iroquois engine. The cooperation of the USA also extended to giving the Canadian crew of the aircraft a SAC training course, and offering the facilities of NACA to test the engine. The Iroquois was installed at the right side of the tail, under the tailplane of the B-47. The first flight was made in November 1957.

Testing was not entirely without problems, including an in-flight failure of the turbine, luckily without any serious consequences for aircraft or crew. But in general the engine was progressing well. The Iroquois was the most powerful engine of the American continent, it had a very good weight-to-trust ratio, and it was fuel efficient. Development costs had not exceeded 90 million dollar --- cheap, even for that time.

Crew accomodation

The two crewmembers sat under clamshell-type canopies. They opened on the top, the two side panels folding left and right. The panels of the pilot's cockpit had a relatively large cutout in them, but the aft compartiment only had two small windows. The windscreen was of V-type with a frame in the middle. A similar type of canopy was fitted to the American F-106, until 1972. This canopy design betrayed a preoccupation with the high-speed bomber interception mission, being obviously less suitable for dogfights with enemy fighters, because it offered a relatively poor view.
However, the cockpit layout was excellent, and praised as one of the best by a group of USAF visitors. The pilot and radar operator sat on Martin-Baker C5 ejection seats. For many test flights, there was only a single crewmember.

Landing Gear

The landing gear of the CF-105 was supplied by Dowty. The three undercarriage legs each had two wheels. On the mainwheel legs, the wheels were set in tandem, to fit withing the wing. The nosewheel leg retracted to the front. The mainwheel legs were attached close to the leading edge, near the dogtooth extension at half-span. They legs retracted diagionally inwards and to the front, and folded into the inboard wing panels. Behind the wheel wells there was enough room for an external pylon.
Because the Arrow was a shoulder-wing design, this meant that the mainwheel legs were very long. Especially because the Arrow stood very high above the ground, with a nosewheel leg that was 3.65 meters long! The nosewheel leg was attached just behind the cockpit, under the jet intakes.

Powerful brakes were provided, as well as a braking parachute. This was installed in the tail cone, between and just above the engines.

Controls and Equipment

The CF-105 relied to a much higher degree on electronic systems for control than any previous aircraft, although it was not a true fly-by-wire design. An AFCS (Automatic Flight Control System) was installed. This worked in three modes: In "normal" mode it assisted the pilot by stabilizing the aircraft. In "automatic" mode the AFCS controlled the aircraft completely, serving as autopilot and blind-landing aid. In theory, fully automatic landings were possible. The "emergency" mode was entered in case of a serious failure, e.g. an engine failure, and served to prevent the CF-105 from entering a stall or another dangerous condition.
The controls were all hydraulically boosted. The thin wing had created some problems for the designers of the hydraulically powered controls. They finally decided to have the hydraulic lines running through the wing fuel tanks.

Special problems were also posed by the Canadian environment. The CF-105 was designed to operate in very cold weather, but also to resist the heat generated by sustained high-speed flight. Some key parts were made from titanium, and an environmental control system was installed to protect the crew and the instruments.


One of the key features of the Arrow project --- which also contributed to its end --- was its armament system. This was as ambitious as the Arrow fighter itself. There were numerous problems with the Astra radar and fire control system, designed by RCA-Victor. This was complex and expensive. In addition, a new missile was being developed for the Arrow, and this was a very ambitious one: Sparrow II. In fact, this missile had already been abandoned by the US Navy because it was too ambitious.
Canada had already had an unpleasant experience with its only serious indigeneous air-to-air missile program, Velvet Glove. This was a short-range (8km) missile with IR guidance. It had been initially intended for the CF-100, but development was so slow that it still was unavailable when the last CF-100s were being delivered. Velvet Glove was finally cancelled in 1954, and was no longer considered for the Arrow.

As a long-range missile for the Arrow, the RCAF chose Sparrow II. This missile was developed between Sparrow I, a beam-riding missile and the Sparrow III with semi-active radar homing. Sparrow III is still in service, but Sparrow II was a much more ambitious project, because it featured active radar homing. The 8in fuselage diameter of Sparrow I was retained, and this required very careful engineering to fit the X-24 radar, developed by Westinghouse. The Sparrow II project was initiated by Douglas in 1955, and it was intended for its F5D Skylancer fighter. But in 1956 the US Navy cancelled both. The project was revived by the RCAF interest, with Canadair acting as a subcontractor for Douglas. However, communication between the two companies was extremely poor, and Sparrow II was not a successful project.

In addition, the Hughes AIM-4 Falcon was considered as short-range missile. Initially, it was planned that the Arrow would carry eight Falcons and three Sparrows in its immense missile bay. Later the number of Sparrow missiles was increased to four. After the cancellation of Sparrow II, the armament was changed to four Falcon missiles, and one or two unguided Genie missiles. Genie, unofficially designated MB-1 or (after 1962) AIR-2, was an unguided rocket with a 1.5kT nuclear warhead. This armament combination, Falcon and Genie, was the same as used by the F-106 and F-101B interceptors. Both missiles were designed for intercepting bombers, and in Vietnam it would be demonstrated that Falcon was nearly useless in fighter-versus-fighter combat.


During the development of the CF-105, there were some political evolutions that changed its intended role. The NORAD agreement that was signed in 1954, created a cooperation between the USA and Canada in the air defense of the North American continent. Although this made it in theory easier to sell the CF-105 to the USAF, in practice this was unlikely to happen, because the Americans preferred to develop their own aircraft.
In 1957, the conservatives replaced the liberals in governement. They and the new prime minister, John Diefenbaker, were much less supportive of the CF-105 project. The order for the CF-105 was reduced to 100, for a price of 781 million dollar. In combination with inflation, delays and development problems, this served to boost the unit price of the CF-105. The public animosity against the expensive interceptor increased, and every problem with the aircraft was published extensively by the press.

The most important problem was that the enemy that the Arrow had been designed to intercept, the high-flying supersonic or transsonic bomber, was perceived by many to be on its way out. Although new attack aircraft, optimized to fly at low altitudes, were on the drawing boards, the missile seemed to be the future both as vector for nuclear weapons and as air defence system. In 1957 the British aviation industry was dealt a sharp blow when Duncan Sandys cancelled all aircraft projects, except the English Electric Lightning, which was considered in a too advanced development stage to be cancelled. If anyone had announced then that the Tu-95 'Bear' would still be in service in 1995, he would probably have been put in a straightjacket immediately.

Meanwhile, the IM-99B Bomarc B surface-to-air missile had been ordered to reinforce the air defence. Bomarc B was more an unmanned interceptor aircraft than a missile in common sense: It was 13.3 meter long, weighed 7260kg, and had a range of 710km. Although Bomarc could ostensibly not replace the Arrow,it did contribute to the feeling that the Arrow was really unneccessary.

The prototypes

For the CF-105, a similar production plan was adopted as the Cook-Craigie plan adopted by the USAF for the F-102. The prototypes were built on production jigs. The first CF-105 Mk.1 was rolled out on 4 October 1957, four years after the definition of the RCAF requirement. This was certainly a notable achievement. The Minister of Defence, George R. Pearkes, announced with some pride a new age in Canadian aviation. The Chief of Air Staff used the opportunity to hint at a possible purchase of the Arrow by the USAF, and to point out that American subcontractors had contributed significantly to the Arrow. Probably this could have saved the Arrow from its final fate, but it was never much more than a faint possibility.
In preparation for the first flight, the design parameters of the CF-105 were fed to a computer --- still very limited, in 1958! --- to predict the behaviour of the aircraft in the air. The usefulness of this was probably small, because the computer predicted that the Arrow was unstable and would crash 13 seconds after take-off.

This did not deter the chief test pilot for the CF-105, Jan Zurakowski. He was born in Poland and flew combat missions in 1939, before he escaped to Britain. There he joined the RAF, and later became a test pilot for Gloster. He joined Avro Canada in 1952. The second test pilot was Spud Potocki, and for the RCAF Lt. Jack Woodman would test the CF-105.

During taxi tests all four mainwheel tires exploded, and the brakes had to be modified. On 25 March 1958 Zurakowski took the CF-105, number 25201 (coded RL-201) into air for the first time. Apart from a landing gear warning light, the flight was without problem. Zurakowski declared that the Arrow was easier to fly than the F-102 or the Gloster Javelin, two other delta-winged fighters. This would later be confirmed by other test pilots, who praised the handling of the CF-105 highly. Zurakoski complained about the high workload in the cockpit, despite the sophisticated AFCS (Automatic Flight Control System), but on the other hand the reliability of the electronic systems was better than expected.

On its third flight, the CF-105 reached Mach 1.1, at an altitude near 13000m. Mach 1.52 was reached on the seventh flight. But on its 11th flight, on 11 June, the left landing gear leg failed during landing, because it had not aligned itself properly with the axis of the aircraft. The landing gear broke off completely, and 201 skidded of the runway on its belly. Damage was not extensive, and on 5 October the aircraft flew again. Meanwhile, on 1 August, the 202 had joined the flight test program. But in November the landing gear of 202 failed when the brakes blocked.


The Arrow was to be cancelled in stages. First to go was the Astra radar and fire control system, and the associated Sparrow II missiles. These were cancelled on 23 September 1958, and replaced by American systems. It was announced that the entire project would be reviewed again in March 1959.
On 11 hours, 20 February 1959, John Diefenbaker announced that the CF-105 was to be cancelled. On the same day, Avro was instructed to immediately halt all work on the CF-105. That included the completion of the first Mk.2 prototypes, which were nearly complete. Employees were sent home, and were told that Avro could not garantuee them a job in the future. Indeed, about 14000 were fired.

It was ordered that all five prototypes, the nearly complete first four Arrow Mk.2's, and the tools would be destroyed. Although the Arrow could now have been a political liability, this scrapping of everything seems to have been the standard procedure. Suggestions that one of the Arrows could be kept flying as an engine test bed, or that RL-206 should be used to set a new speed record, were dismissed. The only remains now is the nose of a single Arrow, RL-206, the sixth prototype. This one was the first Mk.2 prototype, but it has never flown.

A might have been

For all purposes, the Avro Arrow had remained one of the greatest 'night have beens' of the aviation industry, competing only with the BAC TSR.2 strike aircraft. Despite being a considerable technical achievement, the Arrow failed to reach the production stage because of problems with the project management and political support.
It would be unfair to blame only the governement that cancelled the Arrow. The RCAF itself was probably unwise in putting its demands so high. Everything it demanded was technically achievable, as was proven by the existence of the Arrow itself. However, it should have been clear from the start that such an expensive aircraft was not affordable, except in the unlikely case that there would be large export orders. The simultaneous development of aircraft, engines, radar system and missiles was a high-risk affair, with a large probability that at least one of these programmes would be a failure. The Sparrow II project may have been the least well-advised of all, because the missile had already been abandoned by the US Navy. A less ambitious project, with more off-the-shelf parts, would have been more realistic. For example Sweden developed several generations of excellent fighter aircraft, but always used derivatives of existing engines.

The RCAF can also be blamed for being too inflexible in planning. The Arrow was hailed as the definitive interceptor, and the projected future versions were intended to fly faster and higher, to carry even more expensive electronics, and to be more effective in killing bombers. One could compare this to the career of the F-101: Derived from a long-range escort fighter, the F-101 evolved into a fighter-bomber with nuclear weapons, an interceptor and a reconnaissance aircraft. Such changing requirements were an inevitable consequence of the longer development time of more complex aircraft. Some of the money spent on the development of radar and armament could have been used better to make the Arrow more flexible and more cost- effective. As an air superiority fighter, the Arrow had the disadvantage of being a very large aircraft, but because of its large wing area and powerful engines it could have been effective. Because of its high performance, the Arrow would probably also have been an good reconnaissance platform. Because of its large bomb bay, generous wing area and ample ground clearance it could also have been an effective fighter bomber. On the other hand, its enormous wing area was a disadvantage for operations at very low altitude. The main problem of the Arrow was its size. Almost any job, except that of a long range interceptor, could have been done more effectively by a smaller aircraft. If the RCAF had accepted external missile carriage, and had taken into account the development of in-flight refuelling, even that task could have been undertaken by a smaller aircraft.

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Post Re: Canada's Broken Dream
The Legend of the Arrow
By George Shaw
Originally found in file avro2.txt on the AHFC BBS
Translated to HTML by R. Kyle Schmidt, July 22, 1995


I worked at Avro Canada as a mechanical design engineer from early 1946 to mid 1960. This period covered the design and development of the Jetliner, the CF100 all weather fighter and the Arrow. Like many others involved in the disaster of Black Friday when the Arrow was cancelled, I found reasonably rewarding work elsewhere, but I never forgot the pleasure I had in working on these advanced and challenging aircraft designs.

Starting in the late seventies there have been a number of reunions commemorating various dates in the life of the Arrow. What surprised me was the number of people who showed up at these reunions. They included many people who had never worked at Avro or, in some cases, had not even been born when the Arrow was cancelled. In the decade of the eighties a large number of books and articles were published about the Arrow, usually praising the design and decrying the decision to cancel the project. Any attempt to denigrate the design drew a sharp response. It was obvious to me that the legend of the Arrow had become part of the Canadian mythology. The subject of this short paper is to try to explain why this is so.

The legend

The legend of the Arrow is the story of a near perfect machine, a supersonic aeroplane created by Canadian engineers, technicians and skilled workers only to be willfully destroyed by Canadian politicians in 1959. This destruction included not only the cancellation of the project, but also the destruction of all visible evidence that the aircraft had ever existed. After more than thirty years, the story of the Arrow has refused to die. One would expect the memory of the event to remain vivid in the minds of those who worked on the project, but there has been a surprisingly wide general interest as well. To date, there have been six non-fiction books, two fictional books, a play and dozens of articles written about the Arrow.(1) Most of this output has been in the past decade.

In spite of much research there are still mysteries surrounding the cancellation of the project and the destruction of all traces of the Arrow and its Iroquois engine. As time goes by, more and more information surfaces: politicians of the Diefenbaker era have written their memoirs; the thirty year time limit on the disclosure of Cabinet documents of the late fifties and early sixties has expired and the freedom of information rules are providing more documentation.

What information has been found supports some shrewd speculations, but what is now most interesting is why the legend persists and even grows with time. To solve this puzzle one has to attempt to answer two questions: was the aircraft as successful a design as the legend suggests? and how and why was the project cancelled? Answers to these two questions should go a long way in explaining why the legend has persisted and, in fact, grown.

Was the aircraft a successful design?

This question has two parts: was it a successful technical design and would it have been a success as a critical part of a weapons system?

The company that designed and built both the Arrow aircraft and the Iroquois engine was Avro Canada. During the war, a Canadian Crown Corporation, Victory Aircraft, produced the English Avro Lancaster bomber. The English firm, impressed with the Canadian performance, decided to start an operation under the name of Avro Canada in this plant after the war. This was not to be a branch plant in the sense that we understand them today. Avro Canada's mandate was to design, develop and manufacture new products. Since capital could not be taken out of England at that time, the operation was financed in Canada. Profits were plowed back into the Canadian firm and by the early fifties the firm had become a conglomerate and later went public in 1957. The aircraft operations were divisions called Avro Aircraft and Orenda Engines. By this time, all the personnel were either Canadian citizens or landed immigrants. In 1962, Avro Canada became Hawker Siddeley Canada and, although it has gone through some rough times, Hawker is still listed on the Toronto Stock Exchange.(2)

Shortly after the second world war, the Canadian military searched for a fighter aircraft that would be suitable for home defence. At that time, the threat was considered to be from long range, high altitude bombers, probably coming in from over the Arctic. As a suitable aircraft could not be found, it was decided to have one designed and built by the new Canadian firm, Avro Canada. This aircraft, the CF100, was a twin engined, two seat, high altitude, all weather fighter. It had the added feature of a Canadian engine, the Orenda, also designed and built by Avro Canada. After some initial bugs were ironed out, this combination was a very successful design. 692 were built including 53 sold to Belgium. The CF100 saw service in Canada and in Europe with NATO, achieving a service life of thirty years.(3)

In the early fifties it was decided to follow the same process in ordering a replacement for the CF100, a new aircraft and engine, from the same source, Avro Canada. The target was to have it in service in the early sixties to meet the postulated threat at that time. This threat was assumed to be supersonic bombers coming in from the Arctic. The requirements were very stiff. The airborne weapon system was to operate either independently or as part of an integrated defence system. The aircraft was to cruise and combat at Mach 1.5 at an altitude of 50,000 feet and be capable of pulling 2g in maneuvers with no loss of speed or altitude. The high speed mission radius was to be at least 200 nautical miles. The time from a signal to start the engines to the aircraft's reaching an altitude of 50,000 feet and a speed of Mach 1.5 was to be less than five minutes. The turn around time on the ground was to be less than ten minutes. This included re- arming, refuelling and replenishing stores. The Arrow, along with a Canadian engine, the Iroquois, developed by Orenda Engines, was designed to more than meet these requirements. In flight tests with a lower powered American engine, the aircraft reached a speed in level flight of Mach 1.96.

For the uninitiated, a speed of Mach 1.0 means you are travelling at the speed of sound. Mach 1.5 is one and a half times the speed of sound and so on. To pull 2g in a maneuver means that the pilot's weight on the seat is twice what it would be in level flight, that is two times the pull of gravity.

In the process of meeting the requirements, a number of innovations such as a removable armament pack, were included in the design. This pack was within the aerodynamic shape of the aircraft, meaning that the type of armament carried had no effect on the aircraft speed.

A new approach was used with the design of the Arrow: there was no prototype. The first plane was built on production tooling. Before the aircraft flew, there was extensive testing of structures, systems and models along with detailed analysis using analog and digital computers. Some seventy hours of early flight testing on five aircraft proved the success of both the design and this procedure. While this approach increased costs early in the program, there were major savings later in both time and money. In man hours spent per pound of airframe the Arrow was an efficient design comparable to the best in the world.(4) Flight testing on five aircraft indicated the requirements could be met. The answer to the first part of the question is a very positive yes.(5)

The second part of the question is somewhat more difficult to answer, since the aircraft was never put into service. The Arrow was to be the delivery part of a weapons system intended to intercept and destroy a high speed bomber invading the northern part of North America. The total system included the aircraft, airborne fire control systems and weapons and a ground based radar and communication system. As we have seen, the aircraft met the requirements set for it. The fire control system started as a Hughes (American) system. This was switched to a Canadian design (Astra) and then reverted to the American system. The weapons followed the same path: first American weapons (the Falcon) then a Canadian design (the Velvet Glove or a modified Sparrow) and finally a reversion to the American weapons. All this chopping and changing was the RCAF's doing, not Avro's. The ground based radar and communications system became part of the Canadian/American North American Air Defence Command (NORAD) set up in 1957.

Whatever weapon the Arrow used was stored inside the interchangeable weapons pack. A system was devised that permitted launching these internally stored weapons fast enough so that the stability of the aircraft was not affected. This meant that a wide variety of weapons could be fired at any speed.

The primary role of the Arrow was as a high altitude, high speed interceptor. The secondary role was to do the same at low altitude. The aircraft could also carry bombs or reconnaissance equipment, all stored in the weapons pack. It is safe to say in answer to the second part of the question, that the Arrow would have been a success at delivering weapons.(6)

How and why was the project cancelled?
The cancellation was, of course, strictly a cabinet decision. We know from Erik Neilson's book, The House is not a Home, that there was no debate or discussion in caucus.(7) They were just told that the decision had been made. In recent years, personal reminiscences by some of Diefenbaker's cabinet ministers describe the sequence of events in the Diefenbaker Cabinet concerning the cancellation of the Arrow.

The Hon. Donald Fleming, Finance Minister in the Diefenbaker Cabinet, goes into considerable detail in his memoirs published in 1985.(8) It is apparent from these memoirs that Cabinet viewed the Arrow contract with concern in 1957, but because they were a minority government facing an election in the near future, Cabinet did not dare to cancel the Arrow then.(9) A big majority in the 1958 election cleared the way to cancel the project, but the Government still needed to create conditions that would make the cancellation palatable to the voting public. Cabinet was well aware that the loss of 25000 jobs (the number estimated to be directly related to the Arrow project) would have serious political and economic ramifications.

On August 28th, 1958 the Hon. George Pearkes, Minister of Defence, presented Cabinet with the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile proposal from the U.S. This was accepted as a viable substitute for the Arrow at a very much lower cost to Canada. At that time, Pearkes recommended the cancellation of the Arrow program.

In September of 1958, the A. V. Roe company was told by the government to reduce the costs of the program. The major saving was the cancelling of the Astra fire control system and replacing it with an American "off the shelf" system. They were also told at that time that the program was to be reviewed in March, 1959.

Sometime between the U.S. president's visit to Canada in July of 1958 and December of 1958, an agreement was reached with the U.S. that if the Arrow and its support systems were cancelled and Canada agreed to use U.S. equipment, there would be defence production sharing between Canada and the U.S. There is no indication of who initiated this agreement.(10)

Senior Canadian Cabinet Ministers attended an international meeting in Paris in mid December of 1958. During discussions at this meeting between the Canadians and the U.S. representatives, the U.S. refused to buy the Arrow. The question put by the Canadian delegation was "will you buy the aircraft", not "will you assist the Arrow project". The selection of which question to ask was critical since in the fall of 1958 an Avro executive had approached the U.S. defence department with the latter question and had received a commitment of assistance for the project. A Minister was informed, but Cabinet did not act on this nor did Fleming mention it in his memoirs.(11)

On December 22nd, 1958, Cabinet as a whole was notified of the U.S. refusal to buy the aircraft. It was agreed at this time that the cancellation and the defence production sharing agreement with the U.S. were to be announced together early in the new year. This action was delayed until February 20th, 1959 because of other problems. Prior to this date, there were no discussions or debates outside of Cabinet. The promised March, 1959 program review which implied some sort of public discussion, was conveniently avoided.

Fleming claimed it was the U.S. refusal to buy the aircraft in December that sealed the Arrow's fate, but the government must have known from the start that the U.S. would never make an off-shore purchase of an aircraft such as the Arrow. As was obvious to any intelligent observer at the time, the powerful U.S. aircraft industry would never have permitted this to happen. This raises the question: why did the Government wait until December of 1958 to formally ask the U.S. if they would buy the Arrow when they must have known for some time that the answer would be no?

It is obvious that the intent to cancel existed early in the Diefenbaker regime. All the Government needed was the right conditions to minimize the political damage. Acceptance of the Bomarc anti-aircraft missile as a cheap substitute for the Arrow along with the defence production sharing agreement with the U.S. provided the conditions the Government was looking for. The obvious conclusion is that the Government delayed asking the crucial question of the U.S. until the other conditions were in place, but asked it early enough so that the March review could be avoided. The government could also claim that no final decision had been made until this late date. Politically, December was a very convenient date.

Cabinet documents released under the thirty year rule, sparse as they are, generally confirm this sequence of events. The documents for 1958 reflect: Diefenbaker's anger with the A.V. Roe "lobby" which he claimed was intense (he commented that the government could not be seen as giving in to such a lobby); concern over the cost of the program; the refusal of the Americans to support the program; and the obsolescence of aircraft created by the ICBM.(12) In 1959 Diefenbaker's main concern was not with the death of the Arrow, but with how to break to the public the news of its death sentence.(13) The 1960 papers show a Diefenbaker agonizing over how to admit to the public that the government was considering buying a supersonic fighter, the CF101 Voodoo, from the U.S.(14) (NORAD was insisting that Canada find a supersonic replacement for the CF100)

Another cabinet minister, the Hon. Alvin Hamilton, in a letter to the press in 1989, repeats the story of the pressure from A. V. Roe, notes the Army and Navy opposition to the Arrow spending and notes the lack of support from outside Canada. He concludes that he was glad the government "fought hard to save the Arrow", but in the end did not give in to "blackmail".(15)

The Hon. John Diefenbaker in his memoirs One Canada: the Years of Achievement 1956 to 1962, does not even mention the Arrow cancellation.

Before the cancellation there was no equivalent to a defence "white paper" that examined Canada's military role and hardware needs and that would have allowed public debate. In fact, Fleming was proud of the fact that not one word of Cabinet's internal discussions was "leaked" before the government was ready to go public. One can appreciate the political expediency of this, but the morality of it is open to question. One price for this secrecy was to force some ministers to make statements that they must have known were not true. The silence on the part of the cabinet created a great deal of unease and uncertainty within A. V. Roe. Charles Grinier, VP of engineering at Orenda Engines, handed in his resignation in the fall of 1958 on the basis that with this air of uncertainty he could no longer hold his design team together. The Hon. Raymond O'Hurley, Minister of Defence Production, persuaded him to withdraw his resignation with the assurance that the program had not been cancelled.(16) A. V. Roe had been told on a number of occasions in 1958 that the pre-production order for 32 Mark 2 Arrows with the Iroquois engine was not in jeopardy.

The cancellation was made a fait accompli on Feb. 20th, 1959, by Diefenbaker's announcement in the House and the simultaneous notice to the company to cease all work. This action purposely left no room for a public debate. A number of reasons for the cancellation were given after the fact. With the Diefenbaker government's concerns about public relations, it is not surprising that a number of them are aimed at discrediting A. V. Roe and the aircraft. Even with the information available at the time, these "reasons" are not too difficult to refute. There were heated arguments, but no debates in the sense that the government was willing to change its mind. There were five major "reasons" given by the government:

"The program was too costly." This appears to have been the major excuse for the cancellation. As described above, the Arrow was an economically efficient design. It was not a cheap aircraft, but then very little modern military hardware is cheap. Diefenbaker's claim was that the Arrow program would have cost two billion dollars by 1964 for 169 aircraft or 12 million for each aircraft and that this was too much. To put this in perspective: in 1982 the CF18 which Canada purchased from the U.S., was estimated to cost 5.2 billion for 138 aircraft or 37.7 million each.(17) Escalating Diefenbaker's estimate for the Arrow from 1962 to 1982 brings his price to 34.3 million each, or 10% less than the CF18. Furthermore, Diefenbaker's estimated figure of 12 million was highly inflated, as shown by the fact that at the same time the company was offering a bare bones price of 3.6 million. The actual cost was in between these two numbers. This would have made the Arrow about half the cost of the CF18.(18) One must remember that most of the money spent on the Arrow stayed in Canada while most of the money spent on the CF18 has left the country.

The RCAF, backed by the department of defence, had put out the requirement for a state of the art sophisticated aircraft. They must have appreciated what it would cost. The only part of the program where a major cost over-run occurred was when the RCAF decided they wanted a Canadian developed fire control system (Astra) and missile (Sparrow/Velvet Glove). This program did exceed its budget and ran behind schedule. Although Avro had no part in this program other than accommodating it in the aircraft, this did have a serious effect on the airframe cost.(19) In the end, the program was cancelled in the fall of 1958 and American equipment substituted (Hughes fire control system and Falcon missiles) with a major reduction in cost. Even with this problem, the cost of the Arrow was a fair one.

The theme running all through the cost argument was that Canada was too small and too poor to undertake such a project as the Arrow without financial help from our Big Brother to the south. If cost of the aircraft only was a major consideration, Cabinet took a very narrow view of its definition. This tunnel vision cost Canada in a number of other ways.

Never publicly stated by the Diefenbaker government was the cost of cancellation. There was a firm order for 32 Mk 2 Arrows with the Iroquois engine. All work completed and outstanding purchase orders for these aircraft had to be paid for along with cancellation penalties. One source suggested that cancellation costs were roughly equivalent to the cost of completing 32 Mk 2s.(20) The government's approach was to hide the cost by spreading cancellation payments over several years so that the total would not appear on any one year's budget. The delaying tactic used was to change the claims procedure half way through the process. It has been said that this policy of deliberate delay bankrupted a number of smaller sub-contractors.(20A)

Any attempt to salvage something from the program was quashed by the government. This was especially true of the Iroquois engine development which was brought to an end while there were potential customers on the horizon for the engine. We will never know how much this cost the country.

Another cost of the cancellation was the sudden loss of some 25,000 jobs scattered across Canada, but mostly in Ontario.(21) More important to the future of the country was the movement of hundreds, perhaps thousands, of skilled engineers and technicians to the U.S.(22) This was a loss Canada could ill afford. Like the cancellation costs, these costs did not figure in the Government's accounting.

Still another loss to Canada was that of the major research and development work and knowledge that sprang from the Arrow program. The destruction of the aircraft and engine and all tooling, test rigs, reports, drawings and computer programs made this work irretrievable. All that was left was what was in people's minds. Since many of these people left Canada, the knowledge went with them. The Arrow cancellation was a serious blow to R & D in Canada. The RCAF's Institute of Aviation Medicine, for example, was heavily involved in the Arrow program and had built up an international reputation for excellence. The cancellation of the Arrow seriously curtailed their work.(23)

The price of Canadian sovereignty, what could have been the cost benefits from the Arrow program and the cost penalties associated with the cancellation do not appear to have been considered at all.

"The aircraft did not have sufficient range." The RCAF specification AIR 7-3 called for a minimum high speed combat radius of 200 nautical miles. The Arrow not only could meet this requirement, but also is quoted as having had a "full internal fuel" radius for this mission of 436 nautical miles.(24) A proposed future modification would have increased the radius to approximately 650 nautical miles.(25) As the statement about range was knowingly incorrect, one can only assume that it was made in order to mislead the public into believing that the cancellation was justified.

"The ICBM with a nuclear warhead had made bombers, and hence fighter aircraft, obsolete." This was, to put it kindly, a misconception. ICBMs with nuclear warheads in the hands of both the Soviet and the West introduced MAD (Mutual Assured Destruction) and a stalemate as far as nuclear war was concerned. It did not prevent conven- tional war with its use of bombers and fighter aircraft. Korea and the build-up of conventional weapons in Europe under NATO prior to 1958 bore witness to this.

When the Arrow was cancelled, neither the West nor the Soviets stopped developing aircraft. The present family of aircraft with their "smart" weapons as used in the Gulf war are the end product of this development. Canada stopped developing its own aircraft, but continued to acquire them. The Voodoo and later the CF18 were purchased from the States and the CF104 built under licence. Military fighter aircraft were a long way from becoming obsolete when the Arrow was cancelled.

"An alternative weapon, the Bomarc, could do the same job at a much lower cost to Canada." The Bomarc was a ground-launched, winged missile that homed in on a radar signal bounced off an incoming enemy. It was an anti- aircraft, not an anti-missile weapon as some members of Cabinet seemed to believe. Its range and performance were roughly the same as the Arrow's.(26) The complete weapons system consisted of the Bomarc with a nuclear warhead and a ground radar and communications system. There was to be a line of launching sites strung across North America near the Canadian-American border. When Canada agreed to accept the Bomarc, two of these sites would be relocated in Canada: one at North Bay and one in northern Quebec. The system was a failure and was gradually phased out by the U.S. How Defence Minister Pearkes and his advisers missed the early warnings of this failure is difficult to understand. In the end, the Diefenbaker government embarrassed the Americans by insisting on using the Bomarc as a substitute for the Arrow after the U.S. was having serious second thoughts about the program. Its main faults were: it could be fired only once making it rather difficult to test; it could not, as with a manned aeroplane, see what the target really was before it blew up the target; it was vulnerable to electronic counter-measures; and it required a nuclear warhead to be effective. This last requirement made many Canadians nervous, since the nuclear explosions protecting the U.S. would all occur over Canada. This did not bother Diefenbaker because he had banned nuclear weapons in Canada!(27) Understandably, the Americans were puzzled.

"Foreign sales, especially to the U.S., were unlikely." Foreign sales were unlikely unless the Canadian government bought the Arrow first and put it into service. With the aircraft in service and a success, there would always be the possibility of foreign sales. The exception would be sales to the U.S. The powerful lobbies of the American aircraft industry could be expected to oppose effectively any U.S. purchase of a complete aircraft. As with the CF100, Canada could go ahead with the Arrow project on its own and then look for sales. Fulfilling Canadian obligations to NORAD and NATO would have been enough to make the Arrow program worth while. Foreign sales, while helpful, were not a prerequisite for the program.


Lacking any government defence policy that had been publicly debated to support the cancellation of the Arrow project, we are left with what amounts to an arbitrary act decided on by a handful of politicians, in secret, behind closed doors. Their decision allowed no debate by the party caucus, parliament or the general public. The decision was supported only by the highly questionable statements outlined above. This leaves the field wide open for speculation which has a high entertainment value, but cannot really prove anything. Several of the most popular speculations are worth a look.

Diefenbaker was the main force behind the cancellation. This is the most popular and plausible speculation. After all, he was the Prime Minister, the man in charge at the time. It seems likely that Diefenbaker had made up his mind to cancel the Arrow program as soon as he came to power. Much of what he did and said after that was maneuvering to discredit the program, avoid public debate and prepare the public to accept the cancellation with a minimum of uproar.

The "intense lobbying" that Diefenbaker complained about so dramatically (it was referred to as blackmail) was the company trying to find out what was going on behind Cabinet's wall of silence. Up until Feb. 1959, the company was told on a number of occasions that the cost would have to be reduced and the project scaled down. At no time was it told that the government was considering cancelling the project, but a lot of negative signals were coming from other sources. Avro had been told in the fall of 1958 to carry out a cost cutting exercise and that the program would be reviewed the following March. Instead, the program was cancelled in February with no review. This avoided any public discussion that might have accompanied the review. Muzzling the company in this manner was a deft political touch in the Diefenbaker tradition.

Personalities may have affected the decision. It is fairly well known that a feud over the Arrow developed between Crawford Gordon, the head of Avro, and Diefenbaker. Crawford Gordon was one of C. D. Howe's "bright young men" who made their mark industrializing Canada during W.W.II. Neither C. D. Howe nor his proteges were Diefenbaker's favourite people. There are stories of a stormy meeting with a model of the Arrow being hurled against a wall. Diefenbaker did not like to be challenged and had a reputation for being vindictive.

Diefenbaker was a small-city lawyer from the prairies. Thus the traditional dislike of the rural West for industrial Ontario reinforced his dislike of the company. There was no sign of compromise on Diefenbaker's part.

The strangest part of the cancellation of the project was the order to destroy all existing aircraft, components, tooling, drawings and documentation. In trying to track down a rumor of this destruction, editors of the Montreal Standard's Weekend Magazine contacted the Hon. Raymond O'Hurley, Minister of Defence Production and were assured that no order for the destruction had been given. An opposition M.P., Paul Hellyer, insisted the aircraft were being destroyed. The magazine chartered a helicopter and photographed what was going on. The photographs clearly showed that the cutting up of the Arrows was already in progress. The official line was that lower echelons were carrying out the destruction as "normal procedure in dealing with classified material" once the project was cancelled and, therefore, not a minister's responsibility.(28)(29)

These public statements were most misleading. The author of the latest book on the Arrow (30) has uncovered a paper trail that tells a different story. This trail includes; - A memo dated Mar. 4/59 from the Ministry of Defence Production (O'Hurley was the Minister) setting up an Arrow termination Team. - A memo from Hugh Campbell, chief of Air Staff, dated Mar. 26/59 recommending reducing the Arrow to scrap. - A memo from Pearkes, Minister of Defence, dated Apr. 8/59 concurring with the recommendation to scrap. - A memo dated May 12/59 indicating concurrence with the order to scrap by the Deputy Ministers of Defence Production, D. A. Golden and Defence, P. R. Miller. There was nothing in the paper trail that directly linked Diefenbaker with the scrapping, but it would have been difficult for him to be ignorant of what was going on.

The political reason for the destruction is fairly obvious: if you are going to kill something, make sure there are no visible remains that could come back to haunt you. Several attempts to salvage something from the Arrow program were quashed by the government.(31) This carries the Diefenbaker touch as a ruthless politician. The speculation that Diefenbaker was primarily responsible for both the cancellation and the destruction is probably close to the truth.

The cancellation was a political payoff to Duplessis, the "Prime Minister" of Quebec. In 1939 Duplessis was defeated in a provincial election. The federal Liberals played a major role in his defeat and in 1958 he saw a chance for revenge. Diefenbaker had led a minority government after the 1957 federal election and called another election in the spring of 1958. Duplessis selected 50 ridings where he felt the Liberals could be defeated, picked candidates, put up $15,000 per riding and turned the Union National machine loose. The Conservatives won 50 seats in Quebec. One of the new members was Raymond O'Hurley, who, it is interesting to note, became the new Minister of Defence Production. This much is a matter of record.(32)

The speculation is that Duplessis would not put up that much effort and $750,000 in cash just for revenge. A shrewd and clever politician such as Duplessis would look for political gain. This gain could have been the cancellation of the Arrow and the transfer of work to Quebec. This is, of course, pure speculation. Still, a strong competitor for the Montreal aerospace industry had been disposed of, opening the way for more contracts to be awarded there. For example, in 1959 it was decided to replace the F86 Sabre and CF100 in Europe with the supersonic Lockheed 104 Lightning that could be used for interception, tactical bombing and reconnaissance. It was to be built under license in Canada. Late in 1959 Canadian firms were asked to tender and while the contract to build the engine went to Orenda, the contract to build the aircraft went to Canadair in Montreal. One rumor had it that Avro Aircraft was actually the low bidder, but that fancy footwork on the part of federal officials managed to insure Canadair got the contract. In all, 200 of these aircraft were built for the RCAF and 140 for the U.S. who distributed them to deserving smaller nations.(33) Such a contract would have helped Avro Aircraft to recover. It is interesting to note that no decision was taken on an F86 Sabre replacement until after the Arrow had been cancelled. This prevented any attempt to fit the Arrow into the replacement role.

American pressure was behind the cancellation. The U.S. certainly had a major influence on the fate of the Arrow . The history of this influence is well covered in the latest book on the Arrow - Storms of Controversy by P. Campagna (34). At the start of the program, the operation and design of the Arrow were discussed with U.S. experts who supported the concept, but offered no financial support. The Americans were kept posted on the progress of the Arrow. A brochure on the Arrow design and performance put out by Avro in 1954 has the notation, "This brochure has been specially prepared for the Canadian and United States Governments and their attendant Services."(35) Some critical testing was also carried out at American facilities. It can be safely assumed that the Americans were well aware of the success of the program.

U.S. support changed with the introduction of the SAGE - Bomarc defensive weapon system in the mid fifties. Canada's active participation was necessary for the success of this system. (See above) Considerable pressure was put on the Canadian Government and the end product of this pressure is indicated in a recently declassified memorandum from the U.S. Secretary of Defence dated June 1, 1960.(36)

"Prior to the NSC (National Security Council) paper (December 1958) and following a visit of the President to Canada in July 1958, Canada took the following actions with the understanding that her defence industry depended upon the U.S. channeling defence business into Canada: cancelled the CF 105 (the Arrow) and related systems contracts; decided to make maximum use of U.S. developed weapons, integrated into NORAD; worked with the U.S. toward a fully integrated continental defence".

Based on self-interest, one would not expect the U.S. to give enthusiastic support to the program. As noted earlier, somewhat belatedly the U.S. did volunteer to an Avro executive to supply the fire control system free. The letter covering this was delivered to O'Hurley in the fall of 1958, but the Diefenbaker government did not follow up on it. The Hon. George Pearkes, Minister of Defence, appearing before the Defence Expenditure Committee in July, 1960, stated very positively that the U.S. Air Force had offered no assistance. One must assume that the letter disappeared in a bureaucratic void since it did not support the government's position. (37)(38)

The question remains - did the Diefenbaker Government take the lack of U.S. support as an excuse to cancel the program? The politicians would have us believe that it was the reason for the cancellation, but speculation suggests the opposite - that in reality it was an excuse.

One got away. There is a persistent belief that one Arrow was rescued from the destruction and is still hidden away somewhere. This is, of course, pure speculation. There is one theory that would give this speculation some credence. It should be remembered that the Arrow aircraft and the Iroquois engine represented very advanced technology, as good as or better than anything in the world at that time. It should also be remembered that beyond its defensive role the Arrow had very powerful offensive and reconnaissance capabilities(39). Several open attempts were made by Western nations to acquire this technology, but the Canadian government blocked each attempt(40). The speculation is that international aerospace organizations would not give up so easily and that clandestine attempts to "acquire" this technology were a distinct possibility.

All these speculations have a ring of truth to them, but they are just speculations. They form the basis for opinions, but they cannot prove anything.

The picture that emerges

Besides the government statements and the speculations, a number of other factors had a bearing on the cancellation. These should also be considered.

The media must take credit for making the cancellation easier for Diefenbaker to carry out. There appeared to be a campaign to downgrade Avro. A number of articles appeared claiming that the Arrow was unnecessary and painting Avro and its employees as a bunch of free-loaders feasting on the public purse. Two of the most effective in this regard, published in 1958/59, were Blair Fraser's article in Macleans and Pierre Burton's column in the Toronto Star. Avro's public relations department was not successful in countering this campaign or in selling the Arrow to the general public.

There was disagreement within the military with the Army and Navy upset that the Air Force was getting the major slice of the budget. This feud played right into Diefenbaker's hands. Again the lack of a publicly debated defence policy confused the issue.(41)

Another factor was the politicians' seemingly total lack of knowledge and appreciation of technology and of the profitable spin-offs possible from such a high-tech project. Few seemed to understand the extensive implications of what they were dealing with.

The picture that emerges from all of this is of a Cabinet that had decided on a course of action and then went about creating the conditions that would support this action. It is also the picture of a Cabinet worried enough about the political ramifications of their actions to avoid any real debate both before and after the event and to destroy any evidence that might come back to incriminate them in the future. Political expediency appears to have been the governing factor throughout. In spite of protestations, the facts belie any serious effort to save the Arrow.

This picture contains mysteries such as: When was the decision made to kill the Arrow and who made it? Why was no attempt made to cash in on the Arrow technology when the opportunity existed? Why was the Bomarc accepted without question as a substitute for the Arrow when its failure was predictable? Was a political debt to Quebec paid off? Who initiated the Defence Production Sharing Agreement with the U.S.? No matter how one looks at it, the cancellation and destruction of the Arrow was a very bizarre, and in many ways inexplicable, episode in Canadian history. No wonder the event has attracted so much attention!

The persistency of the legend

It is understandable that the people who worked on the project should feel keenly about it. What is not so easy to appreciate is why so many who were not there or who have been born since then, should take such an interest in promoting and defending the Arrow legend.

The legend does have its detractors, but each attack on the Arrow legend has drawn a quick response from the legend's defenders. In the last few years there has been a number of such attacks. A writer of a standard school history text changed the reference to the Arrow from "a flawed piece of engineering" to "a marvel" after the error of his ways had been pointed out to him.(42) Another historian writing in a financial magazine, decried the Arrow program as too much for a small country such as Canada to tackle. His point was spoiled somewhat by the irony of the advertisement on the page opposite his article. It portrayed a Swedish Saab automobile beside the shadow of the company's supersonic fighter.(43) A university professor in Ottawa responded to Bomphrey's play about the legend of the Arrow by condemning the aircraft and labeling the designers as a bunch of incompetents.(44) He drew a very sharp response. By and large the critics have had little effect on the legend except perhaps to strengthen it.

The reasons the legend has persisted and grown over the years since the cancellation on Feb. 20th, 1959 (known as Black Friday) are not too complex. To start with, the basis for the legend is founded in fact: the Arrow was a successful design and its cancellation and destruction have a number of dark corners and possible villains. This makes fertile ground for legend building. The number of rather interesting speculations that cannot be proven or disproven also promotes the legend.

The Arrow affair puts the senior politicians of 1959 in a very bad light. This strikes a sympathetic chord in the large portion of the public today who hold the present senior politicians in low esteem. The reasons have not changed: lack of vision; intense partisan politics; lack of well defined policies; great ignorance of technology; and an inferiority complex about Canadian capabilities. All these are present in today's politicians as they were in the politicians of 1959, thus making the legend very believable and pertinent today.

But for perhaps the strongest reason the legend is popular to-day one must go back in history. During World War II, major advances were made in the industrialization of Canada, with the forced growth of local industries. After the war, there were great expectations that the goal of industrial independence could be achieved. The Arrow, with its proof of Canadians' capabilities of successfully tackling a most difficult job, symbolized the high point in this struggle. Its cancellation and the act of vandalism that followed the cancellation, are seen as a turning point. From then on, we seem to have gone down hill and lost control of our own destiny. Our economy is branch plant oriented and very vulnerable, as the present depression has proven. Clearly defined turning points in a country's destiny are the stuff legends are made of and the Arrow debacle is no exception. In the minds of many people, the Arrow legend is a lament for what Canada could have been and as such, the legend is not likely to disappear.


The irony is that the two major programs the government used to support cancellation of the Arrow: the Bomarc and defence production sharing, both turned out to be predictable flops. In 1958, prior to the actual cancellation of the Arrow, the U.S. planned to build forty Bomarc bases. The program ran into trouble and the number was reduced to eighteen, then to twelve with the proponents of the Bomarc fighting to save the program. Canada was told in mid July of 1960, just over a year after the cancellation of the Arrow, of the program's delay and work on the two bases in Canada was slowed down.

The problems with the Bomarc had serious repercussions. On Feb. 4th, 1960, Cabinet was told that a supersonic fighter was needed to defend Canada. The Commander in Chief of NORAD, General Kuter, was requesting the replacement of the CF100 with some up-to-date equipment. The Canadian Chiefs of Staff recommended the purchase of 66 C101Bs (the Voodoo) from the U.S. These were second hand aircraft costing less than the Arrow, but with much inferior performance.

The political implications of this proposed purchase so soon after the Arrow cancellation were obvious. On March 8th,1960, Cabinet decided not to negotiate it. The international situation deteriorated and on July 4th a proposal was put before Cabinet to exchange 37 CL44s, freighters built by Canadair in Montreal, for the 66 Voodoos. Each package was valued at about 155 million. A deal was worked out and announced by Diefenbaker about a year later on June 12th, 1961.(45) Interestingly enough, there is no record of any CL44s being sent to the USAF. This exchange fell through because it was an election year in the U.S. and the administration there did not want to risk antagonizing the American aircraft industry. The final deal was for Canada to man sixteen Pinetree Line radar bases in exchange for the Voodoos.(46) Obviously this final deal was not as much help to Canadian industry as the original proposal would have been, but then bargaining with the U.S. has never been easy. This is especially true when our politicians leave themselves little to bargain with.

Not so well known is the fact that defence production sharing turned out to be a playing field sharply tilted in favour of the U.S. The purchasing procedure in the U.S. followed the normal practice of issuing a specification to those on the bidder's list in the U.S. and calling for tenders to be in by a certain due date. An information meeting would be arranged by the agency calling for tenders so that all the prospective bidders would have a chance to ask questions and get any uncertain areas cleared up. When the specification was issued to U.S. suppliers, it would also go to a joint U.S./Canadian committee who would decide if Canadian suppliers could take part in the bidding. If the answer was yes, the specification would then be sent to the Canadian government, which would circulate it to Canadian firms.

With these built in delays, by the time a Canadian firm got the specification, the date of the information meeting would be past and the due date for tenders rapidly approaching. There were even cases in which the request for tenders arrived after the closing date. Thus, frequently it was not worth the effort to prepare a bid. Should a Canadian firm decide to bid, there were a couple of other hurdles to overcome. Offshore bids had an automatic 15% penalty assessed against them. If an American firm that was in an area of high unemployment put in a bid, it had an advantage of up to 20% over both American and Canadian bids. Crumbs from the table would be a better name than Defence Production Sharing.(47)

George Shaw
First written August 1991
Revised June 1994


The Legend of the Arrow
Footnotes and References
Publications about the Arrow and Avro Aircraft
Fall of an Arrow - Murray Peden - Canada's Wings, 1978.
The Arrow - James Dow - James Lorrimer & Co., 1979.
There Never Was An Arrow - E. K. Shaw - Steel Rail Publishing, 1979 (2nd edition 1981)
Avro Arrow - Richard Organ, Ron Page, Don Watson, Les Wilkenson - Boston Mills Press, 1980.
Shutting Down The National Dream - Greig Stewart - McGraw-Hill Ryerson, 1988.
Storms of Controversy - Palmiro Campagna - Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd - Toronto 1992
Scrap Arrow - Robert R. Robertson - General Publishing Co. - 1975.
Last Flight of the Arrow - David Wyatt -Ballentine Books, 1990.
The Legend of the Avro Arrow - Clinton Bomphrey - Staged in Ottawa and Toronto 1989/90.
Other related books;
The Avro CF-100 - Larry Milberry - CANAV Books, 1981.
The Avro Jetliner - Jim Floyd - Boston Mill's Books, 1986.
Canadian Aircraft Since 1909 - K. M. Molson & H. A. Taylor - Canada's Wings Inc., 1982.
A brief history of A. V. Roe Canada is given in Canadian Aircraft Since 1909 by Molson and Taylor pages 15 to 18
For a detailed description and history of the CF100 see the book, The Avro CF100, by Larry Milberry.
Page 34 of the Avro Newsmagazine, summer of 1958 issue.
All the books about the Arrow agree that it was a successful achievement. The best technical description is the book Avro Arrow by Organ, Page, Watson and Wilkinson.
The capability of the Arrow as an interceptor was never seriously challenged. This role is described in the Avro Arrow by Organ et al, pages 133 to 137. That it had a tactical role as a bomber and reconnaissance aircraft is also described in the same book on pages 156 and 157. The latter roles were played down since Canada was not supposed to have offensive capabilities. The CF18 does, of course, have the dual capabilities of defence and offence. The evolution of the modern fighter aircraft both politically and technically is covered in Chapter 18 of The Role of the Fighter in Air Warfare by James J. Halley, published by Ziff-Davis Flying Books in 1978.
Page 118 and 119 of The House is not a Home by Erik Neilson and published by Macmillan, 1989.
Page 9 to 19 of Vol. 2 of So Very Near by the Hon. Donald Fleming.
Ibid. page 416 and 417 of Vol. 1
See ref. #36 below.
From a transcript of an interview with Fred Smye who was General Manager of Avro Aircraft in 1958 and 1959. The interview was done for the CBC by George Robinson.
Column in the Ottawa Citizen of Jan. 13, 1989 by Jim Robb.
Column by Geoff Johnson in the April, 1990, issue of Aviation and Aerospace.
Column by Mark Kennedy in the Ottawa Citizen dated Feb. 21, 1991.
Letter to the Editor by the Hon. Alvin Hamilton printed in the Ottawa Citizen, Feb. 21, 1989.
Page 123 of The Arrow by James Dow.
Pages 249 and 256 of There Never was an Arrow by E. K. Shaw
The subject of cost is well covered in Chapter 5 of The Arrow by Dow. Note especially page 135.
Page 133 and 137 of Avro Arrow by Organ et al.
Footnote on page 158 of Fall of an Arrow by Peden.

20A. This situation was described to the writer by an executive of AirResearch, a firm that was claiming major cancellation charges.
Page 157 of Fall of an Arrow by Pedan.
Ibid. Page 160.
For a detailed study of the cost of the loss of R & D see the 1979 paper by Daniel R. Perley. The need for defence oriented science and technology policies in smaller N.A.T.O countries: The Canadian AVRO CF-105 Arrow as a case study.
See brochure Twin engined, supersonic, all-weather fighter issued by A. V. Roe Canada in 1954.
Page 155 of Avro Arrow by Organ et al.
For the Bomarc performance see Appendix II of There Never was an Arrow by E. K. Shaw.
Erik Neilson touches on the problem of nuclear weapons on page 124 of The House is not a Home. The problem of Canada's acquisition of weapon systems such as the Bomarc and the CF101 Voodoo with its Genie missile that both required nuclear warheads is covered in detail in Chapter ten of The True North Not Strong & Free by Peter C. Newman.
Page 141 of The Arrow by Dow.
Hugh Shaw and Frank Lowe were the editors at Weekend Magazine who interviewed O'Hurley and ordered the photographs taken.
Appendix to Storms of Controversy by Campagna. This Appendix contains copies of various government letters and memos pertaining to the Arrow.
An attempt to sell the Iroquois engine abroad was quashed by the governemnt (Ref. page 186 of There Never was an Arrow by E. K. Shaw) as was an attempt to send two CF105s to England for research purposes.(Ref. page 145 of Avro Arrow by Organ et al)
Page 404 to 409 of Duplessis by Conrad Black
Pages 138 & 139 of Canadian Aircraft Since 1909 by Molson and Taylor.
Chapters 2 & 4 of Storms of Controversy by Campagna cover the American involvement in the Arrow in considerable detail.
Cover sheet for a brochure describing the Arrow published by Avro Aircraft in 1954.
Ref. memo from U.S. Secretary of Defence dated June 1, 1960, quoted on page 51 of the Sept./Oct. 1988 issue of Engineering Dimensions magazine - article by P. Campagna.
From transcript of the Fred Smye interview (see #11 above)
Page 123 of The Arrow by Dow.
Pages 156 & 157 of Avro Arrow by Organ et al.
Ibid. page 145.
Page 110 of The Arrow by Dow.
Page 62 of the May/June 1991 issue of Engineering Dimensions. The reference is to a textbook, A Military History of Canada, by Desmond Morton.
The Feb. 1989 issue of the magazine Report on Business. The reference is to book criticism by Michael Bliss.
Article by A. Trevor Hodge in the Feb. 9th, 1990, issue of the Globe & Mail.
Pages 213 to 216 of Vol. 2 of So Very Near by Donald Fleming.
Page 101 of The True North Not Strong and Free by Peter C. Newman and article in the Toronto Daily Star of Friday, Oct. 21, 1960.
The author continued to work at Avro Aircraft until August of 1960. He had personal experience with a number of bids prepared under the Defence Production Sharing Agreement.


Black, Conrad. Duplessis.
Dow, James. The Arrow. James Lorrimer and Co., 1979.
Campagna, Palmiro. Storms of Controversy; The Secret Avro Arrow Files Revealed. Stoddart Publishing Co. Ltd., 1992.
Fleming, The Hon. Donald. So Very Near. Vol. 1 & 2. 1985.
Halley, James J. The Role of the Fighter Aircraft in Air Warfare. Ziff-Davis Flying Books. 1978.
Milberry, Larry. The Avro CF100. CANAV Books, 1981.
Molson, K. M. & Taylor, H. A. Canadian Aircraft Since 1909. Canada's Wings, 1982
Neilson, Erik. The House is Not a Home. MacMillan, 1989.
Newman, Peter C. The True North Not Strong and Free. McClelland and Stewart. 1983.
Organ, Richard. Page, Ron. Watson, Don & Wilkenson, Les. Avro Arrow. Boston Mills Press, 1980.
Pedan, Murry. The Fall of an Arrow. James Lorrimer & Co. 1979.
Shaw, E. K. There Never Was an Arrow, 2nd ed. Steel Rail, 1981.

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Published Books (non-fiction)

Campagna, Palmiro. Storms of Controversy, Stoddart, Toronto, 1992
Peden, Murray. Fall Of An Arrow, Stoddart, Toronto, 1978
Organ, Richard, Page, Ron, Watson, Don, & Wilkinson, Les. Avro Arrow, The Boston Mills Press, Erin, Ontario, 1980
Stewart, Greig. Shutting Down The National Dream, McGraw-Hill Ryerson, Scarborough, 1988
Shaw, E.K. There Never Was An Arrow, Steel Rail, 1981
Dow, James. The Arrow, James Lorrimer and Co., 1979.
Gunston, Bill. Early Supersonic Fighters of the West, 1972.
Jane's All The World's Aircraft, 1958.
The Aerospace Heritage Foundation of Canada. CF-100 Restoration Project, AHFC, 1995.
Orchard, David. The Fight for Canada: Four Centuries of Resistance to American Expansionism, Stoddart, 1993 (pp 100-109).
Molson, K.M. and Taylor, H.A. Canadian Aircraft Since 1909, Canada's Wings Inc., Stittsville, Ontario, 1982.
Fuller, G.A., Griffin, J.A., and Molson, K.M. 125 Years of Canadian Aeronautics: A chronology 1840-1965, Canadian Aviation Historical Society, Willowdale, Ontario, 1983.

Technical Papers

Woodman, Jack. Flying The Avro Arrow, Canadian Aeronautics and Space Institute Symposium, Winnipeg, May 16, 1978
Butz, J.S. Jr. CF-105 Displays Advanced Engineering, Aviation Week, October, 1957.
Also, Aviation Week: Jan 13, 1958 (p103), Nov 10, 1958 (p31), March 9, 1959 (p289)
DeBiasi, Victor. Avro Arrow: New Frontiers of Fighter Design, Space/Aeronautics, May, 1959.
Flight International, August 22, 1958 (p263)
Stratford, H. Ralph. Feather Weight Feet for 30-ton Giant, Canadian Aviation, February, 1958.
Lenkowsky, M. Avro Arrow Ground Support, Canadian Aviation, December, 1957.
Hemphill, Ernie. Canadian Industry Outlook, Canadian Aviation, December, 1958.
Hemphill, Ernie. Keystone to Industry's Development, Canadian Aviation, January, 1958.
Hemphill, Ernie. Avro's CF-105 An Ultimate in Interceptors!, Canadian Aviation, October, 1957.
Continental Air Power Role of the Avro Arrow, Canadian Aviation, February, 1958.
Editorial. Wanted: End to Speculation On the Avro Arrow Program, Canadian Aviation, September, 1958.
Editorial. Economic Expedience Seals Fate of the Arrow Program, Canadian Aviation, October, 1958.
Avro's CF-105 Arrow, Canadian Aviation, November, 1957.
CF-105 Tooling New Compounds Cut Costs, Canadian Aviation, September, 1957.

Magazine Articles, etc

Thuma, W.R. On the Trail of the Arrow, Engineering Dimensions, May/June 1995, pg 39
Campagna, Paul, P. Eng, "Avro Arrow-An Aviation Chapter in canadian History", pp46-53, Engineering Dimensions, Sep/Oct 1988
Orr, John L., P. Eng., "Bringing Down the Arrow: A 30-Year Retrospective", pp 33-36 & 55, Engineering Dimensions, Jan/Feb 1989
Campagna, Palmiro, P. Eng., "Avro Arrow Setting the Record Straight", Engineering Dimensions, pg 42, Jul/Aug 1993
Douglas, Robert G. Flying Saucers From Canada!, American History of Invention and Technology, Vol. 11, No. 3, Winter, 1996.
Military Technical Journal, No. 3, February 1996.
The Nation, February 7, 1959 (p113 or 115)
Aeroplane Monthly, June 1989 (p354)
Air Classics, January 1989 (p28)
Air Enthusiast Eight (p354)
Peden, Murray. Fall of an Arrow, Wings/Airpower, Sentry Books.
Fine Scale Modeler, Avro CF-105 Arrow, Hobbycraft Canada, Workbench Review, December, 1988 (p18)
Fine Scale Modeler, Avro CF-100 Canuck, Astra, Workbench Review, October, 1986 (p13)
Johnson, Brian D., Raising The Arrow, Maclean's, January 13, 1997.
Johnson, Brian D., A slow launch for the white ghost, Maclean's, January 13, 1997.
Callwood, June, Requiem For A Dream, Maclean's, January 13, 1997.

Theatrical Presentations / Video / Film

Bomphray, Clinton. The Legend of the Avro Arrow, Playwright's Union of Canada, Toronto, 1990. (This play was great!)
Avro Arrow, CF-105... A Short History, Aviation Videos, 1988.
Lloyd, James. Arrow: From Dream to Destruction, Aviation Videos, 1992.
Avro Canuck, CF-100... All Weather Interceptor, Aviation Videos.
CF-105 Avro Arrow Enthusiast Edition, Aviation Videos.
Avro Jetliner, C-102... North America's First Jet Transport, Aviation Videos.
Avrocar... Avro's Flying Saucer, Aviation Videos.
Too Good To Be True: The Arrow, the Jetliner, and James C. Floyd, Rudy Inc., Toronto, 1993. See it on TVO (Watch for Elwy Yost for the lead in).

The End of an Arrow, Lynx Images Releasing, 1991

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Fri Nov 19, 2010 8:29 am
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Post Re: Canada's Broken Dream
Some photo's that I found around the web

Test Model being fired into Lake Ontario


Another Model Test Flight

In Flight shot against a a blue sky


Getting Onboard

A Canuck Support Aircraft


Lined Up


On Display


The Landing Gear


The Iroquois Engines



The Maiden Voyage





The 201 In Flight


The Roll Out


The Roll Out Black & White


Looking Down On an Arrow


Assymbly Drawing of an Arrow


The Intake


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Fri Nov 19, 2010 8:47 am
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Post Re: Canada's Broken Dream
Arrow on a Wall


On the Assembly Line


In Flight Banking to Port


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Fri Nov 19, 2010 8:49 am
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Post Re: Canada's Broken Dream
Flight Logs

Date (dd/mm/yy) Flight Number Duration Total Time Pilot Remarks
RCAF 25201 (RL201)
25/3/58 1 0:35 00:35 Zurakowski Initial Flight
1/4/58 2 0:50 01:25 Zurakowski Nose gear failed to retract
3/4/58 3 1:05 02:30 Zurakowski Reached Mach 1.1
15/4/58 4 1:15 03:45 Zurakowski No telemetry
17/4/58 5 1:10 04:55 Zurakowski U/C snag following g's at 450kt
18/4/58 6 0:55 05:50 Zurakowski M1.25
18/4/58 7 0:40 06:30 Zurakowski M1.52 at 49,000 ft
22/4/58 8 1:10 07:40 Woodman Familiarisation M1.4
23/4/58 9 0:45 08:25 Potocki Familiarisation M1.2
7/6/58 10 1:45 10:10 Zurakowski Damper problems, Nosegear door stuck down
11/6/58 11 1:20 11:30 Zurakowski Aircraft damaged on landing
5/10/58 12 1:20 12:50 Potocki Acceptance test after repair
11/12/58 13 1:10 14:00 Potocki Gear down check flight - modified elevator controls
15/12/58 14 1:25 15:25 Potocki Damper checks - gear unsafe indication
20/12/58 15 1:25 16:50 Potocki Damper checks - stbd gear not up and locked
21/12/58 16 0:45 17:35 Potocki Damper checks - stbd gear not up and locked
5/1/59 17 1:00 18:35 Potocki Damper checks - 20,000 ft
5/1/59 18 0:45 19:20 Potocki Extension ASI to 650kt at 17,000 ft
17/1/59 19 1:00 20:20 Potocki Damper checks - elevator hinge movement
24/1/59 20 1:05 21:25 Woodman RCAF Damper checks
27/1/59 21 1:00 22:25 Potocki General Damper handling
31/1/59 22 0:45 23:10 Potocki Extension of flight envelope
31/1/59 23 0:40 23:50 Potocki Extension of flight envelope
7/2/59 24 1:0 24:50 Potocki Roll and sideslip up to M1.3
19/2/59 25 0:50 25:40 Potocki Stick tape and roll rates up to M1.7
RCAF 25202 (RL202)
1/8/58 1 1:35 1:35 Zurakowski Initial flight. 30 000ft
23/8/58 2 1:00 2:35 Zurakowski M1.5 Damper Checks
26/8/58 3 1:05 3:40 Zurakowski M1.62
26/8/58 4 1:00 4:40 Zurakowski M1.7
27/8/58 5 1:05 5:45 Zurakowski Ottawa Telemetry Check M1.5
28/8/58 6 1:05 6:50 Potocki Damper Handling. M1.7
28/8/58 7 1:20 8:10 Zurakowski Ottawa Telemetry Check M1.72
14/9/58 8 1:05 9:15 Zurakowski Damper Handling.Telemetry U/S
14/9/58 9 1:10 10:25 Zurakowski Damper Checking. M1.86 @ 50 000ft
16/9/58 10 1:10 11:35 Zurakowski 2.2g, M1.2 and damper check. Pitch Oscillation =/- 3g
26/9/58 11 1:05 12:40 Zurakowski Pitch Damper Check. Subsonic
26/9/58 12 1:00 13:40 Zurakowski M1.55
28/9/58 13 0:55 14:35 Woodman M1.7 @ 50 000ft. RCAF Handling
28/9/58 14 0:45 15:20 Potocki M1.55. 3g @ 36 000ft. Pitch Oscillation +/- 3g
3/10/58 15 1:25 16:45 Potocki Pitch Oscillation Investigation
3/10/58 16 1:05 17:50 Peter Cope Familiarization M1.5
5/10/58 17 0:50 18:40 Potocki All dampers up to M1.45. 500kt @ 9000ft. Undercarriage doors open. Stick tape with yaw damper
27/10/58 18 1:05 19:45 Potocki Max speed 500kt IAS @ 7500ft on pivot door check. M1.5 @ 42 000ft on damper checks. P/D not acceptable
29/10/58 19 0:45 20:20 Potocki Flutter Check. M1.7
29/10/58 20 0:45 21:15 Potocki Flutter Check. M1.8
8/11/58 21 1:10 22:25 Potocki Assessment of modified elevator. Parallel servo and feel trim to rear not satisfactory
11/11/58 22 1:15 23:40 Potocki 510kt ASI 7500ft. Max speed of M1.95-1.96 obtained from 50 000ft. Brake seizure on landing. Aircraft damaged. Starboard gear broken off.
RCAF 25203 (RL203)
22/9/58 1 1:35 1:35 Zurakowski Initial Flight. M1.2
1/10/58 2 0:45 2:20 Potocki Snag Clearance. M1.7
6/10/58 3 1:00 3:20 Cope Performance 1A tailconsed up to M1.7 @ 50 000ft
16/10/58 4 1:10 4:30 Potocki Fuel consumption and level speed checks @ 35 000ft. Subsonic
17/10/58 5 1:05 5:35 Woodman Undercarriage door trouble stbd side. Low speed P.E.s with F-86
18/10/58 6 1:10 6:45 Potocki Level speeds and fuel consumption. Supersonic on climb
19/10/58 7 1:15 8:00 Woodman Partial P.E.s, aborted high speed checks due to red light at M0.95
31/10/58 8 1:00 9:00 Cope Utility hydraulic falure. Gear down flight
7/11/58 9 1:10 10:10 Cope Fuel consumption @ 35 000ft and single engine checks. Air conditioning failure - refrigerated. Subsonic
20/1/59 10 0:55 11:05 Potocki Check flight to M1.7 with modified elevator system. Aircraft turbine seized
1/2/59 11 1:15 12:20 Woodman RCAF damper check
19/2/59 12 1:10 13:30 Potocki Damper optimization. Observer D.E. Darrah carried.
RCAF 25204 (RL204)
27/10/58 1 1:10 1:10 Potocki Initial Flight - gear down 250kt max
22/11/58 2 1:05 2:15 Potocki Check Flight
30/11/58 3 1:10 3:25 Potocki Continuation of snag clearance to M1.2
2/2/59 4 1:10 4:35 Cope Check Flight - Directed to Trenton
3/2/59 5 1:15 5:50 Potocki Gear down ferry to base
7/2/59 6 1:10 7:00 Potocki Clearance flight - limited to M1.5 by pedal judder
RCAF 25205 (RL205)
11/1/59 1 0:40 0:40 Potocki Initial flight gear down

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Fri Nov 19, 2010 9:02 am
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Post Re: Canada's Broken Dream
Avro Model found in Lake Ontario ... 90621.html

An interesting story and photo of a mansion, not sure of the validity though ... 954/page2/

☆ FavoriteActions▾Share this▾NewerOlderThe Four WatchersAVRO Mansion…and the "One" That Got Away.
WHEN A.V. ROE Canada Limited started to unravel as a company it had already become the 3rd largest company in Canada within only a few short years.

AVRO was not only building the famed Avro Arrow, and those FLYING SAUCERS (the Avrocars), but it had also set its’ sights on a venture into space!

Even more importantly, and even more secretly than the Arrow and Iroquois projects, AVRO Canada had embarked on another large-scale goal known to only a select few. AVRO Canada was already midstride in building a large, “vertically integrated” empire of enterprise!

This was the goal, not only according to famed aviation author Peter Zuuring, Avro and Arrow expert, but according to others as well.

It was here, on this 11-acre parcel of land, high above the streets of Toronto, where details of the “empire” could be discussed with an absolute guarantee of privacy.

Here…far away from the Government of Canada, the RCAF, the “moles” inside the Avro plants, and all others who just didn’t understand INDUSTRY, plans for this collossal empire were being forged, and then routinely executed. Expansion through acquisition.

Viscount Montgomery, “Monty” (formerly commander of the Eighth British Army in North Africa during WW II), was entertained by AVRO Canada and enjoyed a private dinner with other notables here, back in the heyday of both Avro and the mansion.

Ironically enough, this English style palace is only two stone throws…maybe three…from the elementary school I had attended from kindergarten to Grade six! I even stumbled upon this “mystery mansion” when I was riding around the area on my Duomatic bike one day.

In Avro’s last days…there had been many, mysterious midnight runs from the Avro Malton facility to Ottawa.

But there was only one such “run” to this refuge. And it was here, at that very last stronghold of AVRO Canada…where very likely the “one that got away” ended up. Brought here, under a shroud of secrecy, during a very well-planned, and well-executed “midnight run”.

I once met a white and wispy haired old man, so long ago now – at an aviation trade show convention. He had overheard me talking about the Avro Arrow to a woman who had recently completed a labour of love: a highly detailed, rectangular quilt of the Arrow in level flight.

He interrupted our talk and grabbed me by the arm (rather forcefully I might add), turned me about, and said, “It’s at the house!”


“It’s at the house!!”


“It’s at the house!!!” “It’s at the house!!!”

“W H A T!!!…HOUSE?”


He immediately produced a pen, and clumsily pulled out a white dinner napkin from his jacket pocket, and wrote down: “TECARBIRSR”.

He pronounced it, “Te-car-bir-s(a)r.”

“The Arrow…is there!”

And then he walked off.

Poof! Gone.

I never did forget the old man, and that strange afternoon encounter…or his, “Te-car-bir-s(a)r."

I actually committed it, the “riddle”, to memory.

Now, that was in the late eighties.

And now, 25 years later, I present to you: TECARBIRSR.

It is the house pictured above. I uncovered it again, through recent Arrow research, and had actually, casually, taken some pictures of the Tudor-style, stone house some months ago.

I FINALLY just solved the riddle…when I chanced upon the name of the house in my research material.

So…was the Arrow “that got away” ever here?

Is it still here…perhaps buried, even entombed, somewhere on the palatial grounds?

Was it moved from here, and if so, when? And…to where?

Many questions folks…and absolutely no answers ~

(If you do know…drop me a line)

(I won’t tell you where the house is, or what it once was called, but you’ll know it with certainty, should you find it, by the Four Watchers just above the main door! And if you do find it, as I did, perhaps you better not pry too deeply because there are very likely MORE THAN the Four Watchers, still watching…)

©2006 - 2007 Paul Cardin
©1997 Maclean's
©1980 The Arrow
©1975 CBC There Never Was An Arrow ... -105Arrow/ ... ow-eng.asp ... .asp?id=95 ... =12&id=193

12 Short Video's ... opics/275/ ... ormat=html ... arrow.html

Believe it or not but this is a family members website below, she was there on the 45th Anniversary of the roll out

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Fri Nov 19, 2010 9:30 am
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Post Re: Canada's Broken Dream
A life Size Model made in Toronto Ontario


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Fri Nov 19, 2010 9:32 am
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Post Re: Canada's Broken Dream
After the demise of the Arrow, the Avro Company begin making prototypes for the US Air Force of the Avro Car


More info and photos here


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Fri Nov 19, 2010 9:35 am
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Post Re: Canada's Broken Dream - The Avro Arrow
Nice post L2, I am an Aviation buff, have been since the 60's had my PP ticket, first solo was in 1972, I have attended every Abbotsford Airshow since 1983.
The story of the Arrow has always been a tragic one for Canada, just think what we would have had if the project had continued, but that's Politics.

Fri Nov 19, 2010 7:21 pm
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Post Re: Canada's Broken Dream - The Avro Arrow
Mizar wrote:
Nice post L2, I am an Aviation buff, have been since the 60's had my PP ticket, first solo was in 1972, I have attended every Abbotsford Airshow since 1983.
The story of the Arrow has always been a tragic one for Canada, just think what we would have had if the project had continued, but that's Politics.

It is by far the biggest blunder in Canadian History :headbang

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Sat Nov 20, 2010 5:55 am
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Post Re: Canada's Broken Dream - The Avro Arrow
Hey L2L - I have always heard of Canadian passion, sure is good to see it in full flight! He he!

My guess would be that the American War Machine could not stand little brother upstaging them in the competition.

Thanks for a piece of history I never knew about.

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Sat Nov 20, 2010 10:49 am
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Post Re: Canada's Broken Dream - The Avro Arrow
It was a shame, trust the politicians!! I am curious about the mansion, you just gotta wonder if.......

Something is going to happen, but what?

Sat Nov 20, 2010 4:08 pm
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Post Re: Canada's Broken Dream - The Avro Arrow
Siam wrote:
It was a shame, trust the politicians!! I am curious about the mansion, you just gotta wonder if.......

I have NO Doubt that it is true Siam but I have to look into it further.

The relative that I mentioned above in the links may know something, I am going to ask her...

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Sat Nov 20, 2010 6:34 pm
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